Работа посвящена анализу факторов устойчивости политических режимов государств Центральной Азии после событий "Арабской весны". Страны Центральной Азии имеют ряд сходных характеристик с государствами арабского мира, ставшими центром революционных движений. К таковым относятся этническая и племенная фрагментация, высокая доля молодёжи в составе населения, социальное неравенство, низкое качество государственного управления, географическая близость к зонам нестабильности и др.. В связи с чем, в экспертном мнении сформировалась позиция касательно возможности дестабилизации государств Центральной Азии. Однако режимам в этом регионе удалось сохранить стабильность. В ходе исследования с помощью регрессионного анализа были протестированы факторы дестабилизации. За базовую была взята модель, опробованная при анализе протестов в арабском мире. Модель включает в себя пять ключевых факторов: 1) степень фрагментации общества и элит 2) доля маргинальных групп в населении (безработная молодёжь) 3) тип политического устройства 4) наличие/ отсутствие крупномасштабных конфликтов в недавнем прошлом 5) степень вмешательства международных акторов во внутренние дела стран региона. В результате анализа было выявлено, что стабильность в центральноазиатском регионе обеспечена, прежде всего, низкой концентрацией маргинальной молодёжи в крупных городах, поскольку значительная часть молодых людей – трудовые мигранты, работающие в России. Важным фактором стал тип политического устройства. Также, как и в арабском мире, центральноазиатские государства с автократической формой правления наравне с имитационными демократиями в наибольшей степени подвержены социально-политической дестабилизации. Ситуация усложняется тем, что государствах Центральной Азии не сформировались устойчивые процедуры передачи власти, а правители ограничены в выборе преемников. Также на стабильность повлияла
консолидация элит вокруг авторитарных лидеров, при которой этническая или клановая лояльность уступила место личной преданности главе государства. При этом при усилении фрагментации в обществе или элитах значительно возрастает конфликтогенный потенциал. Основываясь на результатах исследования, можно сказать, что наибольший потенциал для дестабилизации имеют Таджикистан и Узбекистан. Киргизия и Туркмения, напротив, нейтрализуют возникающие предпосылки к усилению напряжённости внутри страны. На данный момент ни одно из государств Центральной Азии не достигло уровня потенциальной нестабильности, при котором в арабских странах начинались революции. Тем не менее, динамика последних лет указывает на вероятность протестных движений в последующие годы.
Comparison of biological and social macro-evolution is a very important issue, but it has been studied insufficiently. Yet, analysis suggests new promising possibilities to deepen our understanding of the course, trends, mechanisms and peculiarities of the biological and social phases of Big History. This article analyzes similarities and differences between two phases of Big History at various levels and in various aspects. It compares biological and social organisms, mechanisms of evolutionary selection, transitions to qualitatively new states, processes of key information transmission, and fixation of acquired characteristics. It also considers a number of pre-adaptations that contributed to the transformation of Big History's biological phase into its social phase and analyzes some lines of such a transformation.
What many anthropologists regard as the major step in political development occurred when, for the first time in history, previously autonomous villages gave up their individual sovereignties and were brought together into a multi-village political unit--the chiefdom. Though long neglected as a major stage in history, recent years have seen the chiefdom come in for increased attention. As its importance has been more fully recognized, it has become the object of serious scholarly analysis and interpretation. In this volume specialists in political evolution draw on data from ethnography, archaeology, and history and apply fresh insights to enhance the study of the chiefdom. The papers present penetrating analyses of many aspects of the chiefdom, from how this form of political organization first arose to the role it played in giving rise to the next major stage in the development of human society - the state.
It is often noted in the academic literature that chiefdoms frequently prove to be troublesome for scholars because of the disagreement as to whether to categorize this or that polity as a complex chiefdom or as an early state. This is no wonder, because complex chiefdoms, early states, as well as different other types of sociopolitical systems (large confederations, large self-governed civil and temple communities etc.) turn out to be at the same evolutionary level. In the present article it is argued that such complex societies can be considered as early state analogues. The most part of the article is devoted to the analysis of the most developed chiefdoms – the Hawaiian ones. It is argued that before the arrival of Cook there was no state in Hawaii. It should be classified as an early state analogue, i.e. a society of the same level of development as early states but lacking some state characteristics. It proceeds from the fact that the entire Hawaiian political and social organization was based on the strict rules and ideology of kinship, and the ruling groups represented endogamous castes and quasi-castes. The transition to statehood occurred only in the reign of Kamehameha I in the early 19th century. A scrupulous comparison between the Hawaiian chiefdoms and Hawaiian state is presented in the article.
Big History is a new field that has been gaining ground rapidly around the world. It deals with the universe's grand narrative of 13.8 billion years and attempts to provide a connection between our past, present and future. Appearing in three volumes, this is the first international anthology of Big History. The first volume, Our Place in the Universe: An Introduction to Big History, provides an overview and notes trends in Big History today. The second volume, Education and Understanding: Big History around the World, considers humanity's search for meaning and expression.
The paper analyzes the current state of the world economy and offers a short-term forecast of its development. Our analysis of log-periodic oscillations in the DJIA dynamics suggests that in the second half of 2017 the United States and other more developed countries could experience a new recession, due to the third phase of the global financial crisis. The economies of developing countries will continue their slowdown due to lower prices of raw commodities and the increased pressure of dollar debt load. The bottom of the slowdown in global economic growth is likely to be achieved in 2017-2018. Then we expect the start of a new acceleration of global economic growth at the upswing phase of the Kondratieff cycle (2018-2050). A speedy and steady withdrawal from the third phase of the global financial crisis requires cooperative action between developed and developing countries within G20 to stimulate global demand, world trade and a fair solution of the debt problem of developing countries.
Big History is a new field that has been gaining ground rapidly around the world. It deals with the universe's grand narrative of 13.8 billion years and attempts to provide a connection between our past, present and future. Appearing in three volumes, this is the first international anthology of Big History. The first volume, Our Place in the Universe: An Introduction to Big History, provides an overview and notes trends in Big History today. The second volume, Education and Understanding: Big History around the World, considers humanity's search for meaning and expression. The third volume, The Ways that Big History Works: Cosmos, Life, Society and our Future, reflects on how Big History helps us understand the nature of our existence and consider the pathways to our future. This volume will challenge and excite your vision of your own life as well as focus on the new discoveries happening around us. Together with the authors, who come from all the inhabited continents of our planet, you will embark on a fascinating trip into the depths of time and space, and--we hope--will join us in coming to an understanding of our origins and our future.
Malthusian cycles are political-demographic cycles that were typical for complex pre-modern societies. Due to a number of mechanisms, within the pre-modern social systems (and some would argue even in the 21st century) population growth tended to produce a set of imbalances and strains, eventually resulting in political-demographic collapses and substantial population decline. After stabilization, the population growth usually re-started – marking the beginning of a new Malthusian political demographic cycle. This entry provides an overview of elements of the Malthusian cycle dynamics, a consideration of its political aspects, a summary of theories and mathematical models that have been advanced to explain the Malthusian cycles, and a discussion of the escape from the Malthusian trap and its political consequences.
In the current paper, we investigate the predictive ability of Goldstone’s demographic structural model. In particular we seek to apply Turchin’s version of it to modeling the social pressures for political instability in the UK. It is then demonstrated that Turchin’s analysis of ‘demographic structural’ pressures in the US presents similar conditions that developed under neoliberalism during the same time periods in both countries. It is also demonstrated that the modeling of social pressures toward political instability in the UK and the USA performed by Peter Turchin and us can throw some light on the factors and patterns of the global sociopolitical destabilization wave of the 2010s. Thus, Goldstone’s demographic structural model might have some predictive potential not only at the national level, but also global scale.
Our review of some modern trends in the development of energy technologies suggests that the scenario of a significant reduction of the global oil demand can be regarded as quite probable. Such a scenario implies a rather significant decline of oil prices. The aim of this article is to estimate the sociopolitical destabilization risks that such a decline could produce with respect to oil exporting economies. Our analysis of the relationship between changes in oil prices and political crises in these economies shows a large destabilizing effect for price declines in the respective countries. The effect is highly non-linear, showing a power-law type relationship: oil price changes in the range higher than $60 per barrel only exert very slight influence on sociopolitical instability, but if prices fall below this level, each further decrease by $10 leads to a greater increase in the risks of crises. These risks grow particularly sharply at a prolonged oil price collapse below $40 per barrel, and become especially high at a prolonged oil price collapse below $35 per barrel. The analysis also reveals a fairly short-term lag structure: a strong steady drop in oil prices immediately leads to a marked increase in the risks of sociopolitical destabili- zation in oil-exporting countries, and this risk reaches critical highs within three years. Thus, the possible substantial decline of the global oil demand as a result of the development of the energy technologies reviewed in the first section of the present article could lead to a very substantial increase in the sociopolitical destabi- lization risks within the oil exporting economies. This suggests that the governments, civil societies, and business communities of the respective countries should amplify their effort aimed at the diversification of their economies and the reduction of their dependence on the oil exports.