Публикации

The authors quantitatively analyse the long-term dynamics of technological progress from 40,000 BCE and offer projections through the 22nd century. We provide one method to measure technological progress over that time period, using a simple hyperbolic equation, yt = C/(t0 – t), as our model. We define yt as the technological growth rate, measured as number of technological phase transitions per unit of time. Our method measures the worldwide technology dynamic growth with an accuracy of R2 = 0.99. We find the singularity date occurs in the early 21st century and expect a new powerful acceleration of technological development after the 2030s followed by a slow-down in the late 21st and early 22nd centuries. The authors discuss the role of global ageing as one of the main factors in both the technological acceleration and the subsequent deceleration.

In this chapter, we consider the process of technological progress presenting one of the options for measuring its speed throughout the entire historical process. We find that the general dynamics of accelerating technological growth over the past 40 thousand years can be described with amazing accuracy (R2 = 0.99) using the following simplest hyperbolic equation: yt = C/t0 − t, where yt is the technological growth rate measured as a number of technological phase transitions per unit of time. Although since 40,000 BP the speed of technological progress tended to generally increase, however, according to the theory of production principles on which we rely, the acceleration of technological progress had noticeable fluctuations. These fluctuations can be explained by the fact that technological development proceeded within the framework of super-long cycles. We show that, within these cycles, the phases of accumulation of basic breakthrough innovations are replaced by phases of rapid growth of improvements in basic innovations and their wide distribution. These fluctuations between cycle phases affect the pattern of acceleration of technological progress. Currently, there are a number of calculations of the point of singularity of the Big History and global evolution, which generally localize the singularity around the first half of the twenty-first century. The point of singularity in our calculations, if we rely only on historical time points, falls on 2018, that is, in principle, it fully fits the results of other studies. There is a fairly reasonable idea of slowing down a number of important social processes (such as demographic development, urbanization), including the speed of technological progress. Indeed, there are already some grounds for talking about signs of a slowdown in progress from the 1960 to 1970s. However, according to the theory of production principles, as already mentioned, there are strong fluctuations in the acceleration of technological progress. We assume that at the moment technological progress is in the fourth—the scientific and cybernetic—production principle. According to this theory, we expect a powerful acceleration of technological progress in the area between the 2030s and the 2070s. In this case, if we take into account the expected time points, the point of singularity, according to our calculations, is estimated to be around 2106. That is, with this method of calculation, we should first expect a new way of acceleration of technological progress, and then, its slowdown in the region of the end of the twenty-first century—the beginning of the 22nd. We also identify the social mechanism for such acceleration and deceleration: in the coming decades, the process of global ageing can cause technological acceleration first and change its direction, and then closer to the end of the present and the beginning of the next century, on the contrary, elderly society can be a brake on scientific-technological progress.

This chapter discusses in some detail the possibility of the Singularity being a product of biased human perception described by the Weber–Fechner law. It is shown that though the Weber–Fechner effect can produce series with a hyperbolic shape, the hyperbolic acceleration pattern with the twenty-first century Singularity detected in Panov and Modis–Kurzweil series is explained first of all by the actual hyperbolic acceleration of the global megaevolution.

The article analyzes relative deprivation as a possible factor of sociopolitical instability during the Arab Spring events using the methods of correlation and multiple regression analysis. In this case, relative deprivation is operationalized in two ways: (a) through the indicator of subjective feeling of happiness on the eve of the events of the Arab Spring, and (b) through the scale of decrease of the subjective feeling of happiness on the eve of the events of Arab Spring. It is shown that the change in the level of subjective feeling of happiness between 2009 and 2010 is a powerful, statistically significant predictor of the level of destabilization in Arab countries in 2011. The next most powerful predictor is the mean value of the subjective feeling of happiness in the corresponding country for 2010. At the same time, the fundamental economic indicators we tested, while controlling for them, have turned out to be extremely weak and at the same time statistically insignificant predictors of the level of sociopolitical instability in the Arab countries in 2011.

This book introduces a 'Big History' perspective to understand the acceleration of social, technological and economic trends towards a near-term singularity, marking a radical turning point in the evolution of our planet. It traces the emergence of accelerating innovation rates through global history and highlights major historical transformations throughout the evolution of life, humans, and civilization. The authors pursue an interdisciplinary approach, also drawing on concepts from physics and evolutionary biology, to offer potential models of the underlying mechanisms driving this acceleration, along with potential clues on how it might progress.  The contributions gathered here are divided into five parts, the first of which studies historical mega-trends in relation to a variety of aspects including technology, population, energy, and information. The second part is dedicated to a variety of models that can help understand the potential mechanisms, and support extrapolation. In turn, the third part explores various potential future scenarios, along with the paths and decisions that are required. The fourth part presents philosophical perspectives on the potential deeper meaning and implications of the trend towards singularity, while the fifth and last part discusses the implications of the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI). Given its scope, the book will appeal to scholars from various disciplines interested in historical trends, technological change and evolutionary processes. 

This introductory chapter discusses the overall place of the twenty-first-century Singularity within the overall Big History. It is shown that to place the accelerating trend of complexity in the context of Big History, we need to distinguish the two forms (arms) of megaevolution so far in the universe. The first arm of evolution is the decelerating development of physical matter and energy into galaxies, stars, and planets from the initial Big Bang. The second arm of evolution is the accelerating rate of complexity evolution in the form of life, humans, and civilizations, which is the main concern of this book. The book is organized to present these historical megatrends, models, interpretations, future scenarios, and more philosophical questions along with the realization and debate about their limitations and uncertainty.

The idea that in the near future we should expect “the Singularity” has become quite popular recently, primarily thanks to the activities of Google technical director in the field of machine training Raymond Kurzweil and his book The Singularity Is Near (2005). It is shown that the mathematical analysis of the series of events (described by Kurzweil in his famous book), which starts with the emergence of our galaxy and ends with the decoding of the DNA code, is indeed ideally described by an extremely simple mathematical function (not known to Kurzweil himself) with a singularity in the region of 2029. It is also shown that a similar time series (beginning with the onset of life on Earth and ending with the information revolution—composed by the Russian physicist Alexander Panov completely independently of Kurzweil) is also practically perfectly described by a mathematical function (very similar to the above and not used by Panov) with a singularity in the region of 2027. It is shown that this function is also extremely similar to the equation discovered in 1960 by Heinz von Foerster and published in his famous article in the journal “Science”—this function almost perfectly describes the dynamics of the world population up to the early 1970s and is characterized by a mathematical singularity in the region of 2027. All this indicates the existence of sufficiently rigorous global macroevolutionary regularities (describing the evolution of complexity on our planet for a few billions of years), which can be surprisingly accurately described by extremely simple mathematical functions. At the same time, it is demonstrated that in the region of the Singularity point there is no reason, after Kurzweil, to expect an unprecedented (many orders of magnitude) acceleration of the rates of technological development. There are more grounds for interpreting this point as an indication of an inflection point, after which the pace of global evolution will begin to slow down systematically in the long term.

The current article investigates the relation between values and modernization applying some elements of the method proposed by Inglehart and Welzel (the authors of the Human Development Sequence Theory) to the data of Shalom Schwartz. The values survey by Schwartz specifies two main value axes, namely, conservation versus openness to change and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement. Our research has revealed that the correlation between these two value axes differs in its direction when estimated for “macro-Europe” (that includes Europe and former settlement colonies of North and South America and Oceania) and “Afroasia” (that includes Asia and Africa). In “macro-Europe,” we deal with a significant positive correlation between openness to change and self-transcendence, whereas in “Afroasia,” this correlation is strong, significant, and negative. We investigate the possible impact of modernization on this difference. To do this, we approximate modernization through such indicators as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the proportions of the labor force employed in various sectors of economy. We find that, in both megazones, modernization is accompanied by increasing openness to change values. As for the self-transcendence/self-enhancement axis, we propose two possible explanations of the different dynamics observed in Europe and in “the East” (Asia and North Africa), namely, (a) that Eastern and Western societies find themselves at different modernization stages and (b) that this difference is accounted for by different civilizational patterns. Further analysis suggests that the latter explanation might be more plausible.

В статье представлен систематический обзор подходов к определению и способу изучения ценностных ориентаций, связи ценностей и социального действия. Авторы проанализировали связь между социально- демографическими группами и их ценностными ориентациями. На основе данных, полученных в результате проведения социологических исследований в России, были проанализированы связи ценностных ориентаций респондентов с их электоральным поведением и электоральными предпочтениями. Кроме того, исследованы ценностные ориентации, характерные для электората наиболее ярких современных политиков. Использование системы Ш. Шварца позволило выяснить, что электорат, в большей степени приверженный ценностям сохранения и при этом наименее приверженный ценностям самоутверждения, поддерживает С. Бабурина и Г. Зюганова. На другом полюсе находятся К. Собчак и особенно А. Навальный, для сторонников которых характерны максимальные значения как индекса приверженности ценностям открытости к изменениям, так и индекса приверженности ценностям самоутверждения. Промежуточное положение зани- мает электорат В. Путина, Г. Явлинского, Д. Медведева, П. Грудинина, Б. Титова и В. Жириновского, но при этом электорат В. Путина, Г. Явлинского и Д. Медведева несколько сдвинут в сторону ценностей сохранения, а электорат П. Грудинина, Б. Титова и В. Жириновского – в сторону ценностей открытости к изменениям. Кроме того, исходя из ценностных ориентаций электората соответ- ствующих (актуальных и потенциальных) кандидатов в президенты на выборах 2018 г., с помощью системы Р. Инглхарта были выделены два основных кластера: класс кандидатов, электорат которых демонстрирует приверженность материалистическим ценностям выживания и традиционно-религиозным ценностям, и класс кандидатов, электорат которых скорее характеризуется приверженностью пост-материалистическим ценностям самовыражения и секулярно-рациональным ценностям.

Хотя влиянию интернет-технологий и социальных медиа на протестную активность уже посвящено немало работ, их воздействие на интенсивность террористических атак изучено пока недостаточно. Стремясь заполнить существующий пробел, Н.Хохлов и А.Коротаев проанализировали связь между показателями распространения интернета и количеством терактов. Согласно их гипотезе, поскольку в ситуации подконтрольности СМИ режиму именно Интернет открывает возможности для быстрого и широкого распространения информации о терактах, увеличение числа интернет-пользователей в автократиях должно быть положительно связано с интенсивностью террористических атак. В странах с демократическими или гибридными режимами, где хотя бы часть СМИ функционирует относительно свободно, такого рода связь должна отсутствовать. Тестирование гипотезы осуществлялось на материалах Global Terrorism Database и базы данных Всемирного банка с использованием отрицательных биномиальных регрессионных моделей.

Проведенное авторами исследование отчасти подтвердило выдвинутую гипотезу. Анализ эмпирических данных показал, что в автократиях распространение интернета действительно является фактором роста интенсивности террористических атак, тогда как в странах с демократическими и гибридными политическими режимами подобной зависимости не просматривается. Вместе с тем полученные результаты не позволяют утверждать, что выявленные различия проистекают из особенностей медиа-среды при режимах раз- ного типа. Проверка этого предположения требует дальнейших изысканий и уточнения исследовательской методики, в том числе за счет смещения фокуса внимания на уровень отдельных регионов, а также изучения каузальных механизмов с помощью смешанных методов и байесовской статистики.

В центре внимания данной монографии находятся дестабилизационные процессы, протекающие в модернизирующихся социально-политических системах. Настоящая работа представляет собой попытку учесть, насколько это возможно, влияние демографических, культурных, политических и экономических факторов на дестабилизацию такого рода систем. Монография состоит из трех частей. В первой части рассматриваются теоретические аспекты модернизации стран мир-системной периферии и полупериферии, а также связь модернизационных процессов с дестабилизационными. Во второй части представлены результаты количественного анализа и моделирования социально-политической динамики модернизирующихся систем. Наконец, в третьей части анализируется социально-политическая динамика отдельных стран и регионов. Монография будет интересна не только специалистам, но и всем, кто интересуется дестабилизационными процессами и революциями, их причинами, факторами и механизмами.

В статье приводится систематический обзор основных методологий глобального мониторинга и прогнозирования социально-политической дестабилизации. Проведен анализ корреляции между прогнозами дестабилизации, генерировавшимися данными системами, и актуально наблюдавшимися уровнями дестабилизации в соответствующих странах. Прогноз, построенный на допущении о том, что уровень дестабилизации в каждой данной стране в следующем году будет пропорционален актуальному уровню дестабилизации в этом году, оказывается во всех случаях обладающим большей прогностической силой, чем прогнозы на базе любого из рассмотренных нами индексов риска дестабилизации (по крайней мере, для всех случаев, когда соответствующие прогнозы были опубликованы). Вместе с тем показано, что до Арабской весны рассмотренные нами индексы все-таки выполняли некоторую полезную функцию, позволяя идентифицировать не столько страны с высоким риском дестабилизации, сколько с особо низкими рисками такого рода. Однако в 2010–2011 годах все индексы рисков дестабилизации дали серьезный сбой. Высокие значения индексов не только оказались не очень хорошими предикторами высокой степени актуальной дестабилизации в 2011 году, но и низкие значения индексов оказались плохими предикторами низкой степени актуальной дестабилизации. В итоге все индексы рисков дестабилизации в 2010–2011 годах продемонстрировали крайне низкие статистически незначимые кор-реляции между ожидаемыми и наблюдаемыми уровнями дестабилизации, что нельзя не связать с аномальной волной 2011 года, запущенной событиями Арабской весны. Как показано нами несколькими способами, после 2011 года предиктивная способность индексов до некоторой степени восстанавливается, вновь становится статистически значимой, но на уровень, предшествующий Арабской весне, так и не выходит. Это подтверждает выводы наших предыдущих работ о том, что Арабская весна в 2011 году выступила в качестве триггера глобального фазового перехода, в результате которого Мир-Система пришла в качественно новое состояние, в рамках которого стали наблюдаться новые закономерности, не учитываемые системами, разработанными до Арабской весны. Таким образом, существующие системы прогнозирования рисков социально-политической дестабилизации утратили последние «конкурентные преимущества» перед методом простой экстраполяции. Имеются основания предполагать, что пандемия коронавирусной инфекции COVID-19 может привести к дополнительному снижению прогностической способности рассмотренных нами индексов. Все это, конечно же, говорит о необходимости разработки нового поколения систем прогнозирования рисков социально-политической дестабилизации.

This book presents the history of globalization as a network-based story in the context of Big History. Departing from the traditional historic discourse, in which communities, cities, and states serve as the main units of analysis, the authors instead trace the historical emergence, growth, interconnection, and merging of various types of networks that have gradually encompassed the globe. They also focus on the development of certain ideas, processes, institutions, and phenomena that spread through those networks to become truly global. 

The book specifies five macro-periods in the history of globalization and comprehensively covers the first four, from roughly the 9th – 7th millennia BC to World War I. For each period, it identifies the most important network-related developments that facilitated (or even spurred on) such transitions and had the greatest impacts on the history of globalization.  

By analyzing the world system's transition to new levels of complexity and connectivity, the book provides valuable insights into the course of Big History and the evolution of human societies.

The performed cross-national tests with negative binomial regression models support the presence of a curvilinear relationship between the quantitative expansion of education (measured with mean years of schooling) and terrorist attack intensity. Growth of schooling in the least educationally developed countries is associated with a significant ten- dency towards the growth of terrorist attack intensity. This tendency remains significant when controlled for income level, type of political regime, unemployment, inequality, and urbanization; wherein the peak of the terrorist attack intensity is observed for a relatively low, but not zero level of the quantitative expansion of formal education (approximately three to six years of schooling). Further growth of schooling in more developed countries is associated with a significant trend toward the decrease of terrorist attack intensity. This tendency remains significant after being controlled for income level, political regime, unemployment, inequality, and urbanization. The most radical decrease is observed for the interval between seven and eight mean years of schooling. In addi- tion, this quantitative analysis indicates the presence of a similar curvi- linear relationship between GDP per capita and terrorist attack intensity with a wide peak from $4000 to $14,000. The explanation of a curvilinear relationship between GDP per capita and terrorist activity through mean years of schooling intermediary can only be partial. The regression ana- lysis suggests that the growth of mean years of schooling with economic development of middle and high income countries may really be one of the factors accounting for the decrease of terrorist attacks in countries with GDP per capita growth. However, this regression analysis indicates that a partial role in the explanation of negative correlation between GDP per capita and terrorist attack intensity for middle and high income countries is also played by a lower level of unemployment rate in the high income countries, as well as by a very high share of consolidated democracies and an extremely low share of factional democracies among the high income states. It is especially worth noting that after the intro- duction of all controls, the coefficient sign for per capita GDP changes from negative to positive, i.e., GDP growth in middle and high income countries after the introduction of controls for inequality, education, unemployment, type of regime, etc. turns out to be a factor of increase rather than decline of the intensity of terrorist activity. On the one hand, this suggests that the negative correlation between per capita GDP and the level of terrorist activity in these countries is actually explained to an extremely high degree by the fact that per capita GDP growth here tends to be accompanied by an increase in the educational level of the popula- tion, a decrease in unemployment, a reduction in inequality, a decrease in the number of factional democracies, and an increase in the number of consolidated democracies. On the other hand, the positive sign (with a statistically significant correlation) indicates here that if in the middle and high countries economic growth is not accompanied by an increase in economic equality and education of the population, a decrease in unemployment, a decrease in the number of unstable factional democ- racies, and an increase in the number of consolidated democracies (that is, if in fact all the fruits of economic growth are captured by the elites, and almost nothing gets from this growth to the commoner population), then such economic growth would tend to lead to an increase in terrorist activity (and not to its reduction).

Currently, the main source for the reconstruction of the most ancient history of humankind is archeology, which almost by definition makes it possible to restore only just a few elements of the most ancient human culture (naturally, almost exclusively – material culture). A mere introduction of comparative linguistic data makes it possible to significantly refine our reconstruction of a respective culture. If a certain linguistic Urheimat may be localized in space and in time within the area and lifespan of a certain archaeological culture, this suggests that we may have an idea of the language spoken by respective population, as the application of comparative linguistic methods allows us to reconstruct the vocabulary of the carriers of the respective protolanguage, that makes it possible to identify a set of terms denoting the realities of family organization, political attitudes, beliefs, etc. A very important part of the reconstructed vocabulary is constituted by the kinship terminology. As is well known (and as is demonstrated in this article again), the kinship terminology displays rather strong correlations with respective types of kinship organization, which could allow to reconstruct important features of clan and family structure of the respective populations. This reconstruction can be further verified by using archaeological and genetic data. It is demonstrated that the papers presented at the International Workshop ‘Murdock and Goody Re-visited: (Pre)history and evolution of Eurasian and African family systems’ that was organized in April 2015 by the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology suggest that we are close to having all the necessary ingredients to undertake such a program of a deep historical reconstruction.