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Regular version of the site
ФКН
Book
Digital Economy: 2024: Pocket Data Book
In press

Abashkin V., Abdrakhmanova G., Vishnevskiy K. et al.

M.: National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2024.

Book chapter
Palyonka

Kotelnikova Z.

In bk.: The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality: A hitchhiker’s guide to informal problem-solving in human life. Vol. 3: A hitchhiker’s guide to informal problem-solving in human life. L.: UCL Press, 2024. Ch. 9.7. P. 377-379.

Working paper
Attitude of Russians to the topic of material well-being: analysis of comments in social media

Fabrykant M., Magun V., Милкова М. А.

SocArXiv. SocArXiv. SocArXiv, 2023

Research Seminar “Why Control Immigration: Strategic Uses of Migration Management in Russia”

Event ended


The School of Sociology invites you to the lecture of Caress Schenk, Assistant Professor of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences (Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan)
“Why Control Immigration: Strategic Uses of Migration Management in Russia”

Time: Tuesday 20 February, 18:10.
Venue: Moskow, Myasnitskaya 11, room 423
If you need a pass to enter the building please contact Ekaterina Sokolova ksokolova@hse.ru











Abstract:

Migration management in Russia is a window into how public policy, the federal system, and patronage are used to manage conflicting demands. This multi-level balancing act demonstrates the importance of high-level politics, institutional interests and constraints, and the conditions under which government actors at all levels can pursue their own interests. Migration control begins with restrictive policies that induce a scarcity of legal labor. Low numbers of legal migrants are a powerful populist tool that leaders can employ in response social anxieties about the labor market and social stability. Restrictive policies also force the majority of migrant workers into the informal sector where they became a source of cheap labor that can satisfy economic demand. At the same time, a scarcity of legal labor can be used strategically by actors throughout the political system.

Using a multi-method ethnographic approach that relies on elite and migrant interviews in 4 regions of Russia between 2009-2015, I will argue that the scarcity of legal labor acts as a patronage resource for bureaucratic and regional elites. Across different policy eras, the driving logic of federal decision makers is reducing the number of legal labor migrants. So long as regional leaders and bureaucrats follow federal signals, they have significant latitude to manage migration including distributing scarce documents to those that have connections, offering state officials (law enforcement and bureaucrats) increased opportunities to extract bribes from undocumented migrants and their employers, and allowing the widespread use of illegal labor with relative impunity.