

Chapter 4

Partition and the Prevention of Ethnic War Recurrence (1945-2004)

1 INTRODUCTION

One of the most remarkable findings to emerge from civil war research has been that *most civil wars experience a recurrence of deadly violence within the first five years of peace*, and there is evidence to suggest that ethnic civil wars in particular are more likely to re-erupt in violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Hartzell, 2017; Licklider, 1995a; Quinn, Mason, & Gurses, 2007). The Democratic Republic of Congo, which officially was at war between 1998 and 2003, has seen conflict re-erupt in several regions since, especially in its north-east, leading to thousands of deaths and over 250,000 displaced by 2008. Ten years later, the country was again at risk of sliding back into war (Deutsche Welle, 2018). The causes are multiple but in part, are due to a weak central government that never managed to reassert territorial control, enabling rival ethnic militias to pursue their goals.

This chapter shifts the focus of the dependent variable from *ending ongoing ethnic civil war violence* to *preventing ethnic civil war recurrence*. The literature on civil war termination, especially as it relates to partition, often conflates these related but separate phenomena, leading to muddled theories and empirical tests. I present a theory to explain how partitioning countries increases the likelihood of an enduring peace and provide a cross-national empirical test of this theory for all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004.

1.1 WHY ARE ETHNIC CIVIL WARS PRONE TO RECURRING VIOLENCE?

The literature on civil wars point to three reasons that explain why ethnic civil wars, in particular, have a high recidivism rate and why, in turn, ethnic partition could provide a lasting

solution. First, decades of research has demonstrated that territorially concentrated ethnic groups increase the likelihood of inter-ethnic violence and is a strong predictor of ethnic rebellion against the state (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Gurr 2000; Laitin 2004; Toft 2003; Walter 2003). Fearon and Laitin (1999, p.16), for example, found that “regional concentration of minority group [was a] powerful and robust factor. . . far more likely to see large-scale ethnic violence than urban or widely dispersed minorities.” The “group concentration” variable from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR) is routinely statistically significant as an independent variable in any regression model where “ethnic rebellion” is the dependent variable (Gurr, 1993; Harff & Gurr, 2004).

The theoretical relationship between regional concentration and violence is still disputed. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that concentration acts as a proxy for a “regional base” that increases a group’s ability to wage war against the center. Regional concentration, they argue, provides ethnic militias with distinct advantages over the state’s armed forces, such as unique knowledge of the territory and the ability to hide amongst ethnic kin.

Monica Toft (2003), on the other hand, argues that a regional homeland acts as “issue indivisibility” between the host state and the ethnic group, decreasing the likelihood for compromise and increasing the likelihood for violence:

Majorities and groups concentrated in a region of a state, especially if that region is a homeland, are more likely to regard control over territory as indivisible than are groups that are minorities, dispersed, or urbanized...if [both state and ethnic group] represent their interests over the disputed territory as indivisible, then violence is likely.


As we saw in Chapter Three with the case study of the Georgia-Abkhazia violence in 1992, ethnic civil wars lead to increasingly homogenous territories of ethnic groups, thus increasing ethnic group concentration. As a result, any ethnic civil wars that do not involve partition, will

increase one of the main predictors of war onset since groups end the war more concentrated territorially than they began the war.

Second, if peace is achieved through a negotiated settlement, a major problem is the absence of credible commitments (Fearon 1998; Walter 2002). Ethnic minority militias are reluctant to disarm after establishing peace for fear that any promises made by the central government will be reneged as soon the minority does not have the ability to wage war. The result is the minority will likely pursue war instead of continuing down the path to a durable peace. As I argued in Chapter Two, that the problem of credible commitment was even more powerful for ethnic wars than non-ethnic wars, which I labeled an “ethnically augmented” problem of credible commitment.

Third, weak states are a predictor of violence, and post-war states are, almost by definition, weak (Esty et al. 1995; Herbst 1996/97); this is part of the “conflict trap” that is at the heart of explanations for continuing violence (Collier et al. 2003). In other words, weak states lead to violence, and violence leads to a further weakening of the state. These three factors encourage recurrence of violence (see Figure 1).


Figure 1: How Processes Endogenous to Ethnic Civil War Increase the Likelihood of Conflict Recurrence



1.2 ETHNIC PARTITION AS A SOLUTION

Given these difficult pressures that encourage renewed violence, partitioning groups offers a powerful solution. First, partition overcomes the ethnically augmented problem of credible commitments by permitting warring factions to retain their own defensive capabilities by constructing two separate ethnic homeland states. Second, by establishing a separate homeland state for an ethnic group, the problem of ethnic concentration decreases as the group no longer is motivated to rebel against the center. After all, the rebellion of ethnically concentrated ethnic groups is almost entirely designed to achieve independence (Gurr 1993; Gurr 2000; Walter 2006).

Figure 2: How Partition Reduces Likelihood of Ethnic Civil War Recurrence



The role of state weaknesses is not resolved by partition, and this poses a risk to peace, but primarily only when partitions do not completely separate ethnic groups. As discussed in Chapter 2, the presence of ethnic minorities under conditions of state weakness are problematic for several reasons. First, states can usually induce cooperative behavior even of enemy ethnic minorities through a combination of incentives and disincentives (Kalyvas, 2006). Weak states are unable to produce this cooperation, potentially permitting conditions for a rebellious, territorially concentrated minority. Second, and more importantly, the neighboring ethnic homeland state created by partition may aim to “protect” its kin minority to advance its own

political interests, such as by expanding its base of support within the country by “saving ethnic kin;” expanding its base of support by increasing new ethnic kin citizens through territorial conquest; and generating a rally ‘round the flag effect of renewed warfare that the regime believes it can win.

1.3 ALTERNATIVES TO PARTITION

There are multiple pathways to prevent ethnic civil war recurrence, but each one come with a cost. Some scholars have focused on eliminating the “supply side” of rebellion, destroying one side’s ability to fight or convincing it of war’s futility (Luttwak 1999; Toft 2006; Wagner 1993). For example, Sri Lanka’s 26-year ethnic civil war came to an end in 2009 after the Sri Lankan armed forces decisively defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The drawbacks to this approach are twofold. First, waiting for military victory means greater civilian suffering as the war drags on; ethnic wars in particular appear to last longer than ideological or other civil wars (Fearon 2004). Second, for ethnic civil wars, there is a statistically significant correlation between military victory and ethnic massacres (Licklider 1995); this seems to have occurred in the closing phases of Sri Lanka’s civil war as well (Economist 2009).

Addressing the “demand side” of rebellion come in at least two forms. From early years of research, scholars and policy makers have suggested that addressing minority grievances will reduce the likelihood of rebellion (Gurr, 2000; McGarry & O’Leary, 1993; Wimmer, 2013). This intuitive appeal, however, has not translated well into negotiated solutions to civil war violence, which have a poor track-record in preventing civil war recurrence (Downes, 2004; Licklider, 1995b; Toft, 2006). Nevertheless, there has been a tendency for negotiated solutions to last longer after the end of the Cold War, and more sophisticated research on the topic has suggested complex peace agreements increase the likelihood of peace durability (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007).

Negotiated solutions, however, still face the problem of weak states, making implementation of agreements difficult, and institutional solutions within a single state do not solve the problem of credible commitments.

Other scholars have focused on post-war reconstruction, emphasizing the need to build state capacity either by improving the economy to provide jobs to potential rebel recruits or to strengthen security through police training, building the armed forces, or providing robust peacekeepers, each of which would make rebel success less likely (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Herbst 1996/97; Oyefusi 2008). Peacekeepers have similarly been shown to dramatically reduce the risk of civil war recurrence (Fortna, 2008), which has built on a rich literature looking at the role of third-parties in maintaining peace (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984). While reconstruction efforts and deployment of a robust peacekeeping force can be successful, the problem comes in the costs: the international community and individual foreign powers are often reluctant to engage in extremely expensive, long-term reconstruction efforts and commitments of foreign troops (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). Partition is offered as a solution where such international support is not forthcoming, where alternative peace-building strategies are required because the alternative is a likelihood of recurring ethnic warfare and civilian suffering. Nevertheless, this book sees reconstruction efforts and deployment of peacekeepers as complementary to the process of partition, strengthening the ability of a war-torn state to avoid sliding back into bloodshed.

Finally, constructivist solutions have been proposed to overcome the risk of ethnic war recurrence. Educational programs, re-writing history textbooks, and transitional justice programs

have all been proposed to overcome mistrust, and especially group hatred (Bass 2000; Hayner 1994; Kaufman 2006; Mendeloff 2004; Minow 1998; Pingel 2008). The problem with these approaches is the time required for results. Constructivist literature has demonstrated that nations and national identity are constructed and malleable, but the process of identity construction takes decades, at a minimum (Anderson, 1991; Connor, 2004; Dumitru & Johnson, 2011). This is hardly a plausible solution to the problem of conflict recidivism that occurs within the first few critical years of establishing peace, but may be a promising route to explore over time.

2 Empirical Tests of Partition as Solution to War Recurrence

Nicholas Sambanis (2000) compiled a dataset of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999 to compare the effectiveness of partition to other explanations of war termination and peace building.¹ Based on his analysis, Sambanis (2000, p.439) concluded that “although it may seem like a clean and easy solution, partition fares no better than other outcomes of ethnic civil war.” He also concluded that “the evidence does not support the assertion that partition significantly reduces the risk of war recurrence.” (2000, p.473) He went on, “I can point to only very weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that partitions help end low-level ethnic violence....More importantly, the positive impact of partitions seems fragile and extremely dependent” (2000, p.478).

The Sambanis analysis has gone some way towards resolving the issue of whether statehood is at the heart of the partition debate, demonstrating that such partitions are not more effective than other strategies at maintaining peace. Further, I specifically coded his civil wars to identify ethno-secessionist wars (those that are more likely to be potential cases of partition)

¹ These variables include gross domestic product per capita, cost of the war as measured by deaths and injury, and the war's outcome (government victory, rebel victory, etc.). See p.469.

using Fearon's coding as a guideline, and found partition not be a statistically significant variable in preventing war recurrence for that sub-set of cases.

Partitions of sovereignty alone, however, if not accompanied by partitions of ethnic groups, only address the problem of credible commitment. Partitions of sovereignty alone could leave large swaths of a given minority population in a neighboring state, establishing a Triadic Political Space, which could be the source of significant conflict in subsequent years. One needs look no further than the repeated conflicts between Pakistan and India or Israel and its neighbors to see the results of partitions that leave significant minorities behind.

2.1 Partitions of Sovereignty and Demography

I now move to an empirical test to determine whether partitions of sovereignty and demography help produce a lasting peace. I build on the Sambanis dataset to achieve this end.

Operationalization

Sambanis used a broad definition of ethnic civil war, which allowed him to draw on a variety of civil war related databases.² He based his definition on six criteria: the war caused more than 1,000 battle deaths; it challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; it occurred within the recognized boundaries of that state; it involved the state as one of the principal combatants; it included rebels with the ability to mount an organized opposition; and it involved parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war (Sambanis 2000, p.444).³ A civil war was coded as ethnic based on other datasets, using case-specific source material when discrepancies emerged Sambanis 2000, Appendix B,

² For consistency, I follow Sambanis's coding for ethnic war in as many cases as possible. He categorized such wars "with reference to as many sources as I could consult for each case. I tried to reflect majority opinion about the coding of each case, where there was disagreement between my main sources." See p. 455. As noted below Tajikistan was recoded.

³ The definition is relatively uncontroversial except for its "1,000 deaths," which does not require an annual death threshold, but rather "1,000 [battle] deaths for the duration of the war." See Sambanis, "Appendix B: Data-Set Notes," (Washington, D.C.:World Bank, 2000), p. 2. For a detailed discussion about the use of battle deaths in the quantitative, cross-national data set, see Sambanis (2004).

p.7).⁴ Sambanis's definition for low-level violence relies largely on the Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997) data set coding all armed conflicts causing 25 or more deaths but falling short of war.

For post-war peace, I use a two and five-year threshold since, as mentioned in the introduction, the first five years are deemed the most critical for conflict recurrence.

Sambanis (2000, p.445) defined partition as "a war outcome that involves both border adjustment and demographic changes." This chapter follows Sambanis and includes instances of both "partition" and "secession." Traditionally, partitions were understood as a "fresh division" of some territory, usually executed by a sovereign (often great) power occurring at the time of decolonization (Schaefer 1990). In my study, however, who imposes partition is relatively unimportant: the critical factor is whether dividing warring groups into separate entities can prevent war recurrence.⁵ Further, whether it is possible to accurately distinguish between secessions and partitions is unclear: Kaufmann, for example, codes Cyprus (1974) as a "partition" but Abkhazia (1992-93) a "secession," even though both Turkish Cypriots and Abkhaz were involved in separatist movements that were ultimately successful because of assistance from an external power (Turkey and Russia, respectively).⁶ Moreover, given that the

⁴ Licklider data (version 2.1), Mason and Fett (1996), Walter (1997), and Regan (1996).

⁵ Debates regarding differences between secession and decolonization also exist, although these debates are unhelpful for the current debate on partition: to suggest that the "separation" of Nigeria and the United Kingdom is similar to the "separation" of Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh conflates two very different events and serves only to obfuscate the partition process in the current debate of ethnic civil wars. Further, current ethnic civil wars often see the language of "colonization" in a highly contested manner. For example, Chechen insurgents claim to be waging a war of liberation against the "colonizing" center of Moscow, whereas Moscow claims the uprising is a secession and sees Chechnya as an integral part of the Russian Federation. In the military campaign beginning in 1999, Russia labeled the Chechen insurgents no longer as secessionists but as bandits, criminals, or Wahhabi radicals. For purposes of analysis, many academics put partition, secession, and decolonization in the same category. McGarry and O'Leary lump "partition and/or secession (self determination)" together in their taxonomy, and include decolonization within it. See, for example, McGarry and O'Leary (1993), pp. 11-16.

⁶ See Kaufmann (1998) p. 126. The role of Turkey in enabling the *de facto* independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been well documented. For the critical role of Russia in enabling Abkhazia's *de facto* independence, see Toft (2003), pp. 87-106.

implications of partition theory affect partitions and secessions equally in the minds of academics and policymakers, it is logical to code both.

De Jure and De Facto Independent Statehood

I follow Scott Pegg (1998, p.26) and others in referring to state-like entities that lack international recognition as *de facto* states, such as the state of South Ossetia, which is legally part of Georgia, recognized by only Nicaragua and Russia.⁷ For partition theory, the importance is the state-like attributes, critical for defense, not the international recognition. As Dov Lynch (Lynch 2002: 835) argues, “the key difference for the *de facto* state resides in its lack of recognized external sovereignty, which prevents it from enjoying membership of the exclusive and all-encompassing club of state.” As a recent review summarized, while various authors disagree on many aspects of *de facto* states, there is agreement that *de facto* states “are remarkably robust, state-like entities” (Kolsto 2006: 727; Vinci 2008).

Finally, it is relatively unimportant whether a postpartitioned entity achieves *de jure* sovereignty (as in the case of Bangladesh’s internationally recognized separation from Pakistan) or *de facto* sovereignty (as in the case of South Ossetia’s unrecognized separation from Georgia); therefore both types are included. Although some scholars have begun to include wars of decolonization in data sets of civil wars (e.g., Algeria from France and Mozambique from Portugal), this practice remains questionable conceptually.⁸ Moreover, because I am primarily

⁷ “A *de facto* state exists where there is an organized political leadership, which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capacity; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time. The *de facto* state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state.” The classical definition of an entity that may be regarded as a sovereign state was established at the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States in 1933. The criteria: (i) permanent population; (ii) a defined territory; (iii) a government; and (iv) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.

⁸ Some civil war databases, such as those used by Fearon (2004) include wars of decolonization. Others, such as Roy Licklider (1995) do not. The *Correlates of War* separates these into “internal wars” and “extrasystemic wars”. Fearon and Laitin (2003) run their analysis both with and without wars of decolonization when testing for causes of civil war onset, recognizing conceptual and theoretical problems for both inclusion and exclusion.

interested in reevaluating Sambanis's analysis, like him, I also exclude such wars. Using Sambanis's data set, I was able to reproduce his estimates.

My Cases

My cases differ slightly from those used by Sambanis. First, I excluded Tajikistan because it did not undergo a recognizable partition during or after its civil war, and because most experts deemed it a regional and ideological, not ethnic, conflict.⁹ Second, I included the case of Bosnia, but where Sambanis uses the 1992 partition, I used the 1995 partition. The 1992 partition of Bosnia from Yugoslavia did not occur at the end of the war, which raged for three more years.¹⁰ I coded the Dayton accords¹¹ as a partition of Bosnia between Serbs, on the one hand, and Bosniaks and Croats on the other.¹² The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two de facto states in 1995, each maintaining separate armed forces that cannot enter the other's territory.¹³ This qualifies Bosnia as a partition. As the realist scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt confirmed at the time, Bosnia "produced a partition settlement....The

⁹ It was not clear from the Sambanis article, appendix, or coding notes in Appendix B as to why Tajikistan was coded as a partition or an ethnic civil war; Tajikistan's separation from the Soviet Union occurs before its war begins. Sambanis recognizes Tajikistan as a coding error in, "Partition and Civil War Recurrence." For Tajikistan as a regional and ideological conflict, see Payam Foroughi, "Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and Solutions," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2002), pp. 39-62; and Dov Lynch, "The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 49-72.

¹⁰ Sambanis (2000), p.43) states, "Bosnian partition from Yugoslavia in 1992." He recognizes some of these issues in an unpublished paper, "Partition and Civil War Recurrence: a Re-Examination of the Evidence." (unpublished paper, Yale University, 2006).

¹¹ The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was initialed in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995, and signed in Paris on December 14, 1995.

¹² The inclusion of Republika Srpska partition from Bosnia also means that I added the Bosniak-Croat dyad as a case of ethnic war ending without a sovereignty partition. This does not appear in Tables 1 and 2, which look only at sovereignty partitions, but does appear in the later comparison between partitions and other war outcomes.

¹³ The two republics are Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is not a case of territorial autonomy because of the existence of separate governments with armed forces that cannot enter each other's territory. The primary conflict was between the Serb forces, on the one hand, and the Croat and Bosnian forces on the other, although the Croat and Bosnian forces also fought each other from mid-1993 until the signing of the Washington treaty of March 18, 1994, after which they fought together against Serb forces. Other coding possibilities therefore include separate Bosniak-Serb and Croat-Serb codings for partition, but the figures for separation are virtually the same and do not affect the results, except to provide an additional "partition." Further, given the conflict between Croat and Bosniak forces, one could include this as an ethnic war without partition as an ending. Again, these results do not affect the final results when comparing partition to nonpartition.

settlement is a veiled partition but a partition nevertheless.”¹⁴ Third, I excluded the 1992 Croatia case because of the difficulty of categorizing it as a war end. Although there were cease-fires between the Zagreb-based Croatian authorities and the Knin-based Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK),¹⁵ the conflict between Yugoslavian/Serb and Croatian forces continued in many regions, including the Serb siege of Dubrovnik and the Croat siege of Bihac. In addition, serious military operations between RSK and Croatia’s army resumed soon after each cease-fire.¹⁶ I therefore exclude this case from the analysis. Given the ongoing violence between Yugoslavian/Serb and Croat forces between 1991 and 1995,¹⁷ it is more appropriate to consider this a Croatian “war of independence,” ending with the partition of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1995, which is what I include in my analysis.¹⁸ Finally, I updated all relevant variables for all cases of ethnic civil war through mid-2004. This update includes the additional case of Kosovo, which was partitioned in 1999.

3 The Centrality of Demography

Social scientists have developed few demographic indicators to capture degrees of ethnic heterogeneity. Tatu Vanhanen (1999), for example, created the ethnic heterogeneity index to explore the general relationship between ethnic conflict and ethnic division. Daniel Posner (2004) has created an index based on politically relevant ethnic groups. Neither index, however,

¹⁴ Measheimer and Walt, “When Peace Means War,” p. 16.

¹⁵ RSK had a separate government and armed forces.

¹⁶ For example, see military operations in the Lika region of RSK (Operation Medak Pocket, September 1993), and the Maslenica and Zadar regions of RSK (Operation Maslenica, January 1993). By the time of the next cease-fire, in 1994, Croatian forces were already preparing Operation Flash, which began in May 1995.

¹⁷ The Yugoslav National Army was heavily involved in the wars for the RSK, as was Slobodan Milosevic.

¹⁸ This is, in fact, how most Croats understand the war (commonly labeled “Domovinski Rat” in Croatian) from 1991 to 1995. In Sambanis’s unpublished paper (“Partition and Civil War Recurrence”), he excludes Croatia altogether, which I find surprising given that the definition he uses for partition in this paper is “an outcome of a civil war that...leads to the formation of a new state out of a part of another state,” which is what occurred in Croatia, where war began in 1991 by conventional counts.

can identify which groups were at war and the degree to which they separated after the war. As a result, I created the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI).


3.1 Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index

In constructing the PEHI, I began with a state that contains a titular ethnic group and a minority ethnic group. The two groups engage in a civil war and, at some point, their territory is partitioned in the hopes of ending the conflict. The result is two countries, each with its own titular majority as well as a potentially “stay-behind” minority from the other ethnic group. To determine the degree to which the ethnic groups were separated, it requires knowing (1) the percentage of the minority group in the original country (recorded as OSM for original state minority); (2) the percentage of the original minority left in the rump state after partition (RSM for rump state minority); and (3) the percentage of the original titular group now found as a minority inside the new state (NSM for new state minority).

Given the theoretical focus on demography, with an understanding that leaving sizable minorities on either side of a new border could increase the chances of renewed warfare and low-level violence, this index uses both new minorities to calculate the degree to which a partition and population transfers succeeded in separating the warring groups. For countries with more than two ethnic groups at war, groups are aggregated if they fought on the same side or if they are treated as one by the opposing force;¹⁹ if there are separate warring ethnic dyads within a civil war, they can be treated as separate wars.

¹⁹ The Minorities at Risk Project follows a similar guideline when aggregating groups vis-à-vis the government. For example, in Darfur today, MAR codes the “Black Muslims of Darfur” as a group, even though there are three different groups: Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit. The same formula is used for the “Southerners” group in Sudan, which comprise Equatorians, Dinkas, Nuers, Anuaks, Shilluks, Latukas, Taposas, Turkans, Moru, Madi, and Azande. See Minorities at Risk Project, “Assessment for Southerners in Sudan” or “Assessment for Darfur Black Muslims in Sudan,” (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005), <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/>.

Figure 1. Components of the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index



To calculate the PEHI, I subtracted the new minority percentages (RSM and NSM) from the original minority percentage (OSM). I then divided this percentage by the original minority percentage (OSM) and multiplied the result by 100. This simple calculation yields the percentage change in the size of ethnic minorities produced by partitioning the country, thus indicating the degree of ethnic separation:

$$\text{PEHI} = \frac{\text{OSM} - (\text{RSM} + \text{NSM})}{\text{OSM}} \times 100.$$

The higher the PEHI number, the greater the degree of separation achieved by partition. The maximum score a partition can receive is +100, indicating a complete separation of the warring ethnic groups. This number falls as the size of the stay-behind minorities grows relative to the original minority percentage.²⁰

3.2 Coding PEHI

Timely data on minority populations in the aftermath of ethnic civil wars proved difficult to find. For coding, I relied on a staple set of books and encyclopedias.²¹ The guiding principle in gathering the data was to have at least two credible sources provide the same numbers; when these numbers were close but not exact, an average was taken. Where two sources could not be found among the staple, I consulted case-specific academic publications and news reports

²⁰ There are different ways to calculate the PEHI. One alternative is to look at the separation from both sides by including an indicator of the percentage of the original majority found in the minority region prior to the war (e.g., ethnic Russians in Chechnya before 1994), which I label MiM (Majority in Minority region), and then to calculate the index as: $[(\text{MiM} + \text{OSM}) - (\text{RSM} + \text{NSM})] / (\text{MiM} + \text{OSM})$. I conducted a sensitivity test using this formula, and others, and found no substantive differences in the results: those cases with high degrees of unmixing scored highly on all formulas.

²¹ The staple set consisted of *Encyclopedia Columbia*, 2001; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2003; Patrick Brogan, *The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife since 1945* (New York: Vintage, 1990); Guy Arnold, *Wars in the Third World since 1945* (London: Cassell, 1995); *Economist* and the *Economist Intelligence Unit* available at www.economist.com; CIA World Factbook; Lexis-Nexis Academic; and International Crisis Group reports.

gauging refugee flows of ethnic groups.²² Where data were unavailable for the year immediately after partition, I used the first available data.

3.3 Results

Table 1 presents the PEHI component figures from the 17 cases of partition that occurred after ethnic civil war between 1945 and 2004. For example, in Azerbaijan OSM – in this case, the Armenians – formed 5.8 percent of Azerbaijan’s population before the civil war. After the civil war approximately 20,000 Armenians remained in rump-Azerbaijan, creating an RSM of 0.25 percent. The number of Azeris found in the new state of Nagorno Karabakh after the war ended was negligible (NSM<0.01). The following equation reflects the PEHI for the case of Azerbaijan:

$$\text{PEHI (Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh)} = \frac{5.8 - (0.25+0)}{5.8} \times 100 = 95.69$$

²² Refugee flows were required for some conflicts, in which case prewar minority percentages were used to obtain absolute numbers of the minority, and refugee numbers were subtracted from the total to arrive at an approximation of the minority remaining in the territory. Where large refugee movements take place - many of these conflicts forced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes - exact numbers are not possible so approximations were required.

Table 1. Calculating PEHI Values for Partitions after Ethnic Civil War

Country	Original State Minority	Rump State Minority	New State Minority	Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index
Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh (1994)	5.8	0.25	<0.01	95.69
Bosnia (1995)	31.2	2.30	3.20	86.40
Yugoslavia-Croatia (1995)	19.7	1.10	4.49	71.62
Cyprus (1963)	18.2	11.90	<.01	34.60
Cyprus (1974)	12.3	<0.01	<0.01	100.00
Ethiopia-Eritrea (1991)	6.4	0.12	<0.01	98.13
Georgia-Abkhazia (1993)	1.8	<0.01	0.08	99.83
Georgia-South Ossetia (1994)	3.0	<0.01	0.05	98.33
India-Pakistan (1947-48)	24.4	10.40	1.60	50.82
India-Kashmir (1965)	10.4	10.40	3.00	-28.85
India-Kashmir (1989-94)	10.4	10.40	3.00	-28.85
Israel-Palestine (1948)	33.3	<0.01	13.80	58.56
Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999)	14.0	0.70	6.00	52.14
Moldova (1992)	31.0	24.00	40.50	-108.06
Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971)	46.0	0.30	0.20	98.91
Russia-Chechnya (1996)	0.6	0.30	2.50	-366.67
Somalia (1992)	27.4	25.00	28.00	-93.43

Note: Scores of <0.01 assume value 0 for calculation of the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index.

3.4 Examining the PEHI

The PEHI indicates whether any one partition selected from the database would be considered a “complete partition” or an “incomplete partition” by partition advocates. A complete partition is one in which the warring minorities are fully separated, leaving negligible stay-behind minorities; an incomplete partition is one in which the minorities are not separated, leaving sizable stay-behind minorities in either of the two emerging states. For this study, any partition that succeeded in separating the warring parties by a PEHI of 95 percent or more is considered a complete partition. The threshold of 95 percent is not fixed, but rather should be seen as a guide to indicate partitions where ethnic groups have been effectively separated in their entirety, a critical demand by partition advocates.²³

Table 2 compares “complete” and “incomplete” partitions against the two main criteria established by Sambanis: recurrence of war and recurrence of low-level violence.²⁴

²³ This accepts the inevitability of small, residual minorities which do not alter the value of the results. The average size of the largest residual minorities found after “complete partitions” amounted to a mere 0.33 percent. Kaufmann argues, “While peace requires separation of groups into distinct regions, it does not require total ethnic purity. Rather, remaining minorities must be small enough that the host group does not fear them as either a potential military threat or a possible target for irredentist rescue operations.” Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars,” p. 163.

²⁴ Sambanis uses postwar democratization as a third criterion and finds postpartition states associated with higher levels of democracy. This chapter does not address these results because they do not form the core of the partition theory argument. Sambanis, “Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War,” pp. 459-464.

Table 2. Complete and Incomplete Partitions

Country	Post Partition Index	Complete Partition?	War Ends for Five Years?	Violence Ends for Five Years?
Cyprus (1974)	100.00	YES	YES	YES
Georgia-Abkhazia (1993)	99.83	YES	YES	NO
Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971)	98.91	YES	YES	YES
Georgia-S.Ossetia (1992)	98.33	YES	YES	YES
Ethiopia-Eritrea (1991)	98.13	YES	YES	YES
Azerbaijan (1994)	95.69	YES	YES	YES
Bosnia (1995)	86.40	NO	YES	YES
Yugoslavia-Croatia (1995)	71.62	NO	YES	YES
Israel (1948)	58.56	NO	YES	NO
India (1948)	58.56	NO	YES	YES
Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999)	52.14	NO	YES	NO
Cyprus (1963)	34.60	NO	NO	NO
India-Kashmir (1965)	-28.85	NO	NO	NO
India- Kashmir (1994)	-28.85	NO	NO	NO
Somalia (1992)	-93.43	NO	NO	NO
Moldova (1992)	-108.06	NO	YES	YES
Russia-Chechnya (1996)	-366.67	NO	NO	NO

As the results in Table 2 indicate, for all partitions achieving a PEHI separation score higher than 50 percent, there were no recurrences of war for at least five years, nor were there recurrences of low-level violence for five years for those partitions that achieved a PEHI score of at least 60 percent, with the sole exception of Georgia-Abkhazia.

Outliers: Georgia-Abkhazia

The Georgia-Abkhazian partition, however, is an exception that proves the rule: the PEHI is a static number, indicating ethno-demographic separation only once at the end of the war, but in the case of Abkhazia post-war migration was not static. Within two years, ethnic Georgians began returning to Abkhazia, and within five years over 40,000 had returned, sparking a return to armed conflict in 1998. Therefore, while low-level violence recurred, *it was because of non-separation*, adding further evidence to the 3G ESD (Johnson, 2015). If we rank the PEHI from highest to lowest, we find that the top 10 partitions experienced no conflict recurrence and no separation achieving a PEHI score above 70 percent experienced a recurrence of war or low-level violence, suggesting the threshold of 95 percent could even be lowered (see also Johnson 2009). For partitions with lower PEHI scores, the results are mixed, with most experiencing either war recurrence or a return of low-level violence.

These data suggest that a partition that successfully separates warring ethnic groups produces substantially different results from partitions that do not separate the groups, which is what the 3G ESD predicts. This further underscores the need to disaggregate partitions into those that separate the warring ethnic groups and those that do not. Although the number of cases is small – there have been only six cases of “complete” ethno-demographic partition – the results are consistent and unambiguous; and if we widen the spectrum to partitions that broadly separated most ethnic groups, the impact on peace is even more compelling. Given the small number, however, these results must also be treated with caution. While partition advocates cannot be faulted for the lack of complete partitions since 1945, they can be honest about what the numbers demonstrate.

Violence Beyond Five Years: Ethiopia-Eritrea & Georgia-South Ossetia

Two other cases stand out. First, Ethiopia-Eritrea passed the critical five-year mark of peace, but then did return to war in 1998. Similarly, Georgia and South Ossetia established peace in 1992 but returned to war in 2008. The 3G ESD Partition theory does not claim that partitioning territories and warring ethnic groups will always prevent a return to war or low-level violence forever into the future; rather the theory suggests that such partitions will increase the chance at a sustainable peace. Further, partition advocates have also argued that any future war between partitioned states will be an improvement over a return to civil war because sovereign states will be subjected to greater international attention and diplomatic pressure, increasing the likelihood of war ending quickly. Ethiopia and Eritrea exemplify this logic: the civil war lasted more than 15 years, whereas the inter-state conflict of 1998 ended within two years following heavy international pressure. The Georgian conflict over South Ossetia in 2008 was even more brief, lasting just six days amidst heavy international pressure, producing relatively few deaths (Horowitz, Weisiger, & Johnson, 2009).

A potential concern with the results of this analysis may be over the issue of endogeneity or whether a selection bias has taken place where cases of complete partition occurred in states where ethnic minorities were already compact and homogeneous, and thus relatively easy to separate after a war without “ethnic cleansing” or large population transfers. Few communities are ethnically homogeneous, however, and even those ethnic groups that are territorially concentrated typically have a significant minority in their midst. In this analysis, all of the “complete” cases involved large-scale forced population transfers during their wars, with the

possible exception of Bangladesh.²⁵ Militias and government armed forces displaced hundreds of thousands of people during the two ethnic wars in Georgia, during the war over Nagorno Karabakh, and during the ethnic war in Cyprus. In the other partition reaching a high PEHI – Bosnia (86.4 percent) – armed forces displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians based on their ethnic identity in what had been an ethnically intermixed territory.

3.5 Stay-Behind Minorities and Peace

There are several countries that experienced incomplete partitions – partitions that do not completely separate the warring ethnic groups – and yet also do not experience war recurrence or low-level violence within the first five years of the end of their civil wars. This indicates that demographic separation is not the only way to prevent war recurrence.

Two dimensions to this issue are relevant to the current analysis. First, a closer look at the incomplete partitions that did not experience an initial conflict recurrence reveal troubling insights. The conflict over India-Pakistan (1947-48) did not recur in the first five years, but the “incomplete” partition, which left substantially inter-mixed populations, was followed by three wars over the proceeding half century. The “incomplete” partition between Israel and Palestine (1948) has seen low-level violence and war recurrence over subsequent decades. Moreover, it was arguably the reintroduction of significant ethnic intermingling after Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 that has led to heightened conflict. Croatia’s “war of independence” (1991-95) also ended with an “incomplete” partition. In fact, Croatia arguable experienced a fragile partition in 1992 with the Republic of Serbian Krajina, but peace never lasted long enough to be deemed a temporary “war end.” The final Croatian military operation of

²⁵ The case of Bangladesh is deceiving due to the large Bengali population that was largely separate from the rest of West Pakistan. Nevertheless, Urdu-speaking Biharis were the targets of violence with tens of thousands of resulting deaths. A Pakistani white paper on the topic estimated more than 60,000 Urdu-speaking Biharis were killed during the brief conflict.

the war in 1995 forced approximately 200,000 Serbs to flee Croatian territory, reducing the percentage of Serbs in Croatia by almost two-thirds by the end of the war, and therefore substantially unmixing the populations.²⁶

Second, the 3G ESD does not stop at demographic separation. As stated in chapter two, state building – *exiting anarchy* – is also a significant factor that can prevent conflict recurrence despite the presence of stay-behind minorities. If some post-partition states are able to exit anarchy faster than others, thus reducing opportunities for violence, this could explain some of the peace. Capturing state-building for a cross-national analysis of post-war situations is almost impossible; certainly no cross-national data is currently available that would suit this purpose.²⁷ However, I turn to case-study work for this purpose in Chapter Five, exploring Moldova's partition in 1992, which included large, stay-behind minorities that did not experience conflict renewal.

3.6 Statistical examination of the PEHI

I added the PEHI to the Sambanis dataset to check for statistical significance on war recurrence. Using binary probit, the variable *warend2* (no war recurrence for at least two years after the end of the civil war) was regressed on the continuous variable PEHI only for ethnic wars that experienced partition. The PEHI is affected by the prewar minority percentages; as a control, therefore, the prewar minority variable has also been included in the model. The results show a positive regression coefficient for PEHI, as one would expect based on the theory, with a *p*-value significant at the 0.1 level (see Table 3).

²⁶ Operation Storm led to 200,000 Croatian Serbs fleeing into neighboring Serbia and Bosnia. See Amnesty International, "Croatia: Operation 'Storm' – still no justice ten years on" (New York: Amnesty International, August 4, 2005), pp. 1-3.

²⁷ Cross-national statistical studies to date that examine state strength or state weakness invariably include war as an indicator of state weakness, new statehood, or partitioned territories as an indicator of state weakness or state failure. All of these indicators would place our partitioned countries as "weak" proving no variation on the independent variable. We require more fine-grained data than is currently available. See, for example, the State Failure Task Force (1995) or Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Table 3. Probit Results for No War Recurrence after Two Years

Variable	B	z-value	p> z
PEHI	.01	1.56	.06
Prewar Minority	-.03	-.91	.18
Constant	.93	1.35	.09

NOTE: N = 17. β is an unstandardized coefficient; z is a z -test of β , and p is the p -value for a one-tailed z -test.

The results suggest that the greater the separation of warring minorities produced by a partition (i.e., the higher the PEHI), the greater the expected likelihood is of not experiencing a return to war for at least two years. Given the small- n (17), however, these results are only suggestive.

4 Alternative Explanations of Partition and Peacebuilding

While it is impossible to include alternative variables in a statistical analysis due to the small n problem, we can turn to a more primitive form of “control variables” by examining whether other explanations can act as sufficient condition for peace.

Drawing on the earlier discussion of peace-building, I include the role of *third parties*, such as peacekeepers. I add a modified variable for the presence of peacekeepers to the dataset. The original Sambanis variable is a 5-point scale, which I dichotomize into the presence of peacekeepers with sufficient strength to enforce any agreement.²⁸ We also discussed the role of military victories. I use the Sambanis variable of War Outcome, which differentiates between:

²⁸ Sambanis’s variable is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000): 0 indicates no intervention; 1 indicates mediation only; 2 indicates an observer mission; 3 indicates traditional peacekeeping operations; 4 indicates peace enforcement. I code the presence of peacekeeping by combining 3 and 4, since this is conventionally used; all other variables I code as an absence of peacekeepers.

military victory by government; military victory by rebels; truce/informal ceasefire; formal settlement/treaty.

Other scholars have examined the role of *war traits*, such as costs of war, and duration (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Zartman 1985). These theories argue that the longer the war and the higher the casualties (i.e., the greater the cost of war), the less likely the war will be to recur because each side is exhausted and does not have the appetite for war renewal. These theories, however, have had mixed results in the literature, with international wars experiencing less likelihood for war renewal, but civil wars experiencing greater likelihood for renewal. For war duration, I use a dichotomized version of Sambanis's dataset, coding wars as either greater than or less than the mean length of all civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The Sambanis average is seven years (84.6 months) for all ethnic wars, and I therefore code each conflict as short or long.²⁹ For deaths during war, I do the same, coding high or low based on the mean death count at 171,469 (civilians and soldiers).

I present the results in Table 4, permitting a comparison of the various alternative independent variables for peace-building, and the dependent variable of a Five-Year peace.

²⁹ Of course much depends on the criteria one uses for civil war; using Fearon's dataset (2004), the mean length of all wars is 11.5 years, but he has a stricter criteria for entry into the dataset biasing the results to longer wars.

Table 4. Comparing Theories of Peace-building

Country	Complete Partition	War Duration	Deaths	Outcome	Peacekeeping Operation	War Ended for 5 Years
Azerbaijan-Nagorno Karabakh (1994)	Yes	Long	Few	Truce	No	Yes
Bosnia (1995)	No	Short	Many	Settlement	Yes	Yes
Yugoslavia-Croatia (1995)	No	Short	Few	Settlement	Yes	Yes
Cyprus (1963)	No	Short	Few	Truce	Yes	No
Cyprus (1974)	Yes	Short	Few	Truce	Yes	Yes
Ethiopia-Eritrea (1991)	Yes	Long	Few	Rebel Victory	No	Yes
Georgia-Abkhazia (1993)	Yes	Short	Few	Truce	Yes	Yes
Georgia-South Ossetia (1994)	Yes	Short	Few	Truce	Yes	Yes
India-Pakistan (1947-48)	No	Short	Many	Settlement	No	Yes
India-Kashmir (1965)	No	Short	Few	Truce	No	No
India-Kashmir (1989-94)	No	Short	Few	Truce	No	No
Israel-Palestine (1948)	No	Short	Few	Gov't Victory	No	Yes
Yugoslavia-Kosovo (1999)	No	Short	Few	Rebel Victory	Yes	Yes
Moldova (1992)	No	Short	Few	Rebel Victory	Yes	Yes
Pakistan-Bangladesh (1971)	Yes	Short	Many	Rebel Victory	No	Yes
Russia-Chechnya (1996)	No	Short	Few	Settlement	No	No
Somalia (1992)	No	Short	Many	Rebel Victory	No	No

As we can see, there is no single variable that can act as a sufficient condition for peace maintenance other than Complete Partition.

4.1 Comparing Complete Partitions with the Alternative for All Ethnic Civil Wars

A comparison of countries that experienced complete partitions with those that experienced other outcomes between 1945 and 2004, including incomplete partition or no partition at all, further reveals the benefits of separating warring ethnic groups. Table 5 shows a cross-tabulation of countries whose ethnic wars ended for at least two years. Seventy-one percent of these wars did not recur. Nevertheless, in cases of complete partition, no country experienced a return to war (100 percent). The chi-square test produced a statistic of 3.92 for a probability of 0.14, although three cells have an expected count of less than five. Using the Fisher's Exact Test, which can be used regardless of how small the expected frequency is, we find a similar statistic of 0.162.

Table 5. Comparing Alternatives for War Recurrence

Did the War End for At Least Two Years?	Complete Partition	Incomplete Partition	No Partition	Total
Yes	6 100%	6 55%	45 71%	57 71%
No	0 0%	5 45%	18 29%	23 29%
Total	6	11	63	80

CHI-SQUARE = 3.92 ($df=2$), PR = 0.141; FISHER'S EXACT: 0.162

In 68 percent of the cases, countries did not experience a recurrence of war for at least five years, while all cases of complete partition (100 percent) avoided a recurrence of civil war. The chi-square statistic is 6.07 for a probability of 0.048, statistically significant at the 0.05 level; again, three cells have an expected count of less than five. The Fisher's Exact is 0.053.

Turning now to low-level violence, an even greater contrast is evident between complete partition and the alternative of incomplete partition or no partition (see Table 6). In 60 percent of

the cases, low-level violence *did not end* for the first two years. Strikingly, for those civil wars that ended with a complete partition, none experienced further low-level violence during that period. The chi-square value is 10.06 for a p -value of 0.007, statistically significant at the 0.01 level, although three cells have expected counts of less than five. Nevertheless, the Fisher's Exact is also 0.007. In other words, 60 percent of ethnic civil wars experienced deadly conflict recurrence within the first two years, but complete partitions did not.

Table 6. Comparing Alternatives for Recurrence of Low-Level Violence

Did Low-level Violence End for At Least 2 Years?	Complete Partition	Incomplete Partition	No Partition	Total
Yes	6 (100%)	3 (27%)	23 (37%)	32 (40%)
No	0 (0%)	8 (73%)	40 (63%)	48 (60%)
Total	6	11	63	80

CHI-SQUARE = 10.063 ($df=2$), PR = 0.007; Fisher's Exact = 0.007

- **Note:** If we turn to the dependent variable of no low-level violence for five years, our results are affected by the aforementioned Georgian-Abkhaz case, where violence occurs, but only after ethnic Georgians returned to Abkhazia. If we drop the Georgian-Abkhaz case from the dataset, the chi-square is 7.77, with a p -value of 0.021; again, three cells have expected counts of less than 5. The Fisher's Exact is 0.024.

These figures strongly support the position of scholars who advocate partition. Complete partitions that separated warring ethnic groups prevented a return to war for at least five years. For the period under review, complete partition was a sufficient condition. Partitions that separated warring ethnic groups have also terminated low-level violence for at least five years. This, too, was a sufficient condition. This finding is all the more significant given that a majority of post civil war countries continue to experience low-level violence, a plague that haunts civilian populations for years after combat operations formally conclude.

5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined partition as a way to prevent the recurrence of ethnic war and low-level violence. After reviewing theoretical issues involving the dynamics of ethnic war, it introduced a new variable – the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index – that captures ethnodemographic separation and partitions into separate statehood for all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004. I found that in all cases where the PEHI showed a complete separation of warring minorities, there were no war recurrences and no occurrences of low-level violence for at least five years after the end of the ethnic civil war. These results trump the alternatives of incomplete partitions and no partitions, providing strong evidence in support of the 3G ESD.

The cross-national results, while important, are insufficient on their own as evidence to demonstrate the validity of the 3G-ESD, primarily because we cannot examine the causal mechanisms at work. To strengthen this finding, I therefore subject the theory to a more rigorous test through case studies of both Georgia-Abkhazia's partition and Moldova-Transnistria's incomplete partition, using process tracing to evaluate the impact of partition on peace and violence.