Civil society index for Brazil was based on secondary information that compiled diverse indicators in comparison with other countries grouped under four dimensions - structure, environment, values and impact. The indicators are a mix of qualitative and quantitative indicators, and each one is scores between 0 and 10. Together these four scores are used to plot, the Civil Society Diamond.

The first index to consider is Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions which deals with state's elections (competitiveness and openness), the nature of political participation in general, type of political regime and its historical development. Brazil is characterized as a democratic state (score 6-9 from the -10 – 10 scale) with a strong democracy trend lasting for 50 years already. We can conclude that the elections conducted in Brazil for this period are truly democratic and the civil society shows a satisfying high level of political participation.

The Freedom in the World Index suggests comparative assessment of global political rights and civil liberties. Brazil is marked as a free country. This means that it is placed at the top of the index’s 1 (most free) -7 (least free) scale. However, if we analyze yearly data by country, we can see an upward trend of moving from partly free state to free state. The was a downward trend during 1933-2000 years, however, Brazil fought back its position and from 2001 till present it is considered to be a free state.

1 Polity IV Project - http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm
Also, we would like to address the human rights area for analysis. We strongly believe that the extent to which rights and freedoms are respected directly reflects the structure of civil society. First, it depicts the level of activity of NGO’s and advocacy organizations. Second, it points out minor groups whose liberties are violated and thus provides the characteristic of civil society’s structure.

Human Rights Risk Index for 2013 illustrates that Brazil is certainly a country of deep concern – the risk of human rights violations is characterized as high with more than 2.5 coefficient. This makes us suggest that the Brazilian civil society is currently not developed to the extent of perfect self-protection. This is the path to follow further on.

In the CIRI Project data series we can find the most risky areas of human rights violations for Brazil. For the last year analyzed (2011), the following areas raise greatest concerns:

- independence of judiciary: 0 (indicates that it is not independent);
- torture: 0 (indicates that torture was practiced frequently in a given year);
- extrajudicial killing: 0 (indicates that extrajudicial killings were practiced frequently in a given year);
- workers’ rights: 1 (indicates that workers’ rights were somewhat restricted);
- freedom of speech: 1 (indicates that there was some government censorship of the media).

So, the area of human physical integrity is the most vulnerable for Brazil. To develop successfully, Brazilian civil society must also be more active in the area of justice and freedom of speech. Nevertheless, it is a positive sign that Brazil has no detrimental problems in such areas as freedom of assembly or political imprisonment. This is evidence for quite healthy civil society’s condition and great prospects for its development.

The OECD Better Life Index reflects the well-being across countries. It is based on data related to 11 topics the OECD has identified as essential to assess the material living conditions and quality of life. What interests us most is the civic engagement parameter: consultation on rule-making (the level of governmental transparency when drafting regulations) and voter turnout. Brazil has a moderate score in between 4.0-5.0, almost in the center of the rating and we conclude that the level of civic engagement leaves much to be desired.

Finally to draw the full picture of environment we also took the following indices and convert them into the used scale for civil society diamond (0-10):

Political rights – score 7–Citizens are endowed with substantial political rights and meaningful opportunities for political participation. There are minor and isolated restrictions on the full freedom of citizens’ political rights and their participation in political processes.
Political competition – score 6 – there is a multi-party system, but it lacks significant ideological distinction.
Rule of Law – score 4

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5 OECD Better Life Index - http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/#/111111111112
6 Democracy Ranking - http://democracyranking.org/?page_id=14
7 Democracy Ranking - http://democracyranking.org/?page_id=14
8 List of Political Parties in Brazil - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_Brazil
Corruption\textsuperscript{9} – score 4
State effectiveness\textsuperscript{10} – score 5 - the capacity of the state bureaucracy is extremely limited
Decentralization\textsuperscript{11} – score 9 - sub-national share of government expenditure is more than 49.9% – in Brazil 54.4% (States 37.9% + Municipality 16.5%)
Basic freedom rights – score 7 – based on the indices of civil liberties, information rights and press freedom.

Up to the 1980s in Brazil civil society was entirely excluded from the policy processes: formulation and implementation, governmental action, making up a non-democratic standard the relationship between Society and State. The State was the provider of ALL the public services. From the 1990s the profile of NGOs has been changed dramatically. They started developing partnerships not only with the State but with private companies, adopting the speech of sustainable development. The model of the process of development of NGOs was completely copied from the United States. The so-called Third Sector seemed to the Government and was presented by him as a way found by civil society to fill the gap left by the State in meeting social demands. This idea was acquired great popularity and has been repeated in academic rounds and disseminated by the media that contributed to the ever-increasing number of NGO’s formed.

In the end of the 1990s the pressure on the Government of Brazil was intensified by the Third Sector. The Government has decided to create a new Third Sector Legislation. However, laws regulating NGOs are complex and diffuse. Complexity of the laws, lack of clearness in the legislation can be used as a toll for corruption schemes, public finding deviation and tax evasion.

- Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (Article 5 Chapter 1)
- Civil Code of Brazil (1930) (Article 13 and 16)
- Law 9, 790 (March 23, 1999) “Introduces rules for granting of “Public Interest Civil Society Organization” status to non-profit private legal entities and institutes and regulates the Partnership Terms” - main Non-Profit law act - OSCIPs. Article 9 - The Partnership Agreement is hereby established as the instrument to be signed by the Public Authorities and entities holding Public Interest Civil Society Organisation status for the purpose of forming co-operative ties between the parties in order to support and execute the public interest activities.

Close to the end of the two-year period established by law, contrary to governmental expectations, the number of requests for requalification as OSCIP submitted to the Ministry of Justice was very low. As indicated in Table 1, in the first two years (1999 - 2000), only 445 requests were submitted and, out of these, a mere 91 were granted (20.45%). This is a low figure, even for a sector whose statistics have not been subject to actual updates since 1991. That year, the survey made by ISER researchers for the worldwide nonprofit mapping project promoted by the Johns Hopkins University, there were around 219,000 nonprofit organizations in Brazil. So, the process of legitimization was not so successful as it was planned. New organizations need quick legitimacy in the field to ensure access to funds and, consequently, to take root and

\textsuperscript{8} World Bank, WGI - http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports
\textsuperscript{9} Corruption Perceptions Index - http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results
\textsuperscript{10} World Bank, WGI - http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports
\textsuperscript{11} Subnational decentralization in Brazil - http://www.portalfederativo.gov.br/biblioteca-federativa/estudos/td_0854.pdf
survive. Since they have not yet become institutionalized, the lack the required legitimacy in the field.

To draw the full picture of civil society in Brazil it is useful to provide the legal procedure to register a NGO.

**Step 1: Convocation**
As the name indicates, the first step is to gather a group of people with the same goals and ideas to create an NGO.

**Step 2: Constituent Assembly**
The Constituent Assembly is a meeting gathering all the components of the future NGO, its founding members. At this meeting, will be approved important points, such as name, mission, goal, headquarters and management of the NGO. This information is present in the NGO’s Statute draft, which is discussed, modified if necessary and then approved during the Assembly.

**Step 3: Finalization of Statute**

**Step 4: Announcement of the Administration body**
The election of the Board of Directors must follow what was approved in the NGOs Statute, and after elected, should be given ownership of the elected positions.

Finally, the NGO was founded, however, it still doesn’t have "status" of legal entity, which only occurs after some bureaucratic procedures.

**Step 5: Legal registration**
In order to register the NGO, the integrants must be prepared to bear with the costs of registration and third parties, as it is necessary to contract the services of a lawyer or an accountant. Costs vary from registry to registry office and professional.

On top, the founding members can count on values ranging from BRL 500,00 (five hundred reais) to BRL 1,000,00 (one thousand dollars) of total costs (copies, endorsements, rates and outsourced services). The money is often achieved through donations, especially if the group already has a history of previous actions in the community.

With the statute approved, the Minutes and attendance list signed, the NGO must hire a lawyer to legitimize the documents adopted at the meeting and forward them to the local Civil Registry Office.

After this step, the NGO is legally registered before the Ministry of Justice. However, it’s also necessary to be registered at the Federal Revenue Service. It is recommended at this time that NGOs have an accountant or accounting firm qualified that will provide the tax records, labor and require the registration of for obtaining the CNPJ (National Register of Legal Entities).

Besides the legal records, there may be needed to register the NGO supervisory bodies related to the object of its social status: social assistance, children and adolescents, education etc.

**CASE-STUDY ANALYSIS**

1. **Brazil’s Landless Workers Movement (MST)**

**General overview**
The MST is Brazil’s most effective (Wright and Wolford, 2003) and Latin America’s largest social movement (MSTbrazil, 2007).
At the beginning, the movement was organized within the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), until 400 people decided to split off in order to take a more active approach to the fight for land reform. This group called itself the MST. The movement was founded in 1984 and since then has become “the most dynamic, best organized, and effective social movement” in Brazil’s history (Petras, as quoted in Wolford, 2003a: 201). Today, its membership has increased to an estimated 1.5 million people, found in twenty-three out of twenty-seven Brazilian states (MSTbrazil, 2007). The MST has two main goals; namely, to achieve a fair agrarian reform and to establish a just and fraternal society.

The movement does not have a single decision-making centre. It is largely decentralized, working through collective leadership (Mark, 2001; Wolford and Wright, 2004). Decisions on local actions are taken democratically in the settlements’ assemblies. Frequently, local MST groups or encampments organize their own protests that are directed at local problems. However, these protests are usually in accordance with larger national campaigns.

**Case - confront neoliberalism**

The campaign was a response to a wave of privatization encouraged by the World Bank and IMF. As of MST’s fifth National Congress in June 2007, its new mission was to “confront neoliberalism...[and to] struggle for the re-statization of public companies that have been privatized”. For one week at the beginning of September 2007, the MST (in alliance with the Unique Worker’s Centre, and 200 smaller movements) organized a plebiscite to demand the renationalization of the mining giant Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD); 3,729,538 million people (94%) voted in favour of its re-nationalization. On October 16-17, the movement blocked CVRD’s principal train tracks and prevented 250,000 tons of iron ore from being delivered. The MST blocked another railroad and the same amount of iron was halted. On November 27, the MST, together with the oil workers’ union (FUP), occupied the seat of Brazil’s National Petroleum Agency (ANP) to stop the auction of oil blocks (i.e. exploration rights) On January 10, the MST and 108 leaders and representatives of diverse organizations and social movements came together to draw up a manifesto calling on the government for a fair tax reform and the reformation of the country’s economic policy.

With the introduction of neoliberal policies in Brazil the MST had to undergo a number of adaptations. An entire campaign is now dedicated to the fight against privatization and in favour of re-nationalization, as exemplified by the activities described above. The change in campaign focus is necessarily connected to a shift in targets. In 2003 the MST’s tactics and targets slightly changed when Brazil’s Workers Party (PT) and President Lula assumed power. Under former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the MST occupied offices of the agrarian reform agency, but now they “occupy roads, estates – there is a different focus because the government is no longer [MST’s] enemy” (Stedile as quoted in Hochstetler, 2004:17).

The actions on October 16 – 17 and November 7, which both involved the occupation of CVRD train tracks, show that both the government and the company are targeted. The government is urged to expropriate the company and the owners of CVRD are told to leave the country. The plebiscite in the first week of September, the occupation of the ANP seat (November 27), and the 62-day march during September and October 2007 were primarily directed at the government.

However, the government is usually not targeted as the primary cause of any given problem (institutions or businesses that endorse neoliberal policies are more often considered to be the originators of the problems); rather, it is targeted for the “absence of positive action”. In many protests, the MST targets the businesses directly. This happened to Stora Enso and Votorantim on October 16, 2007 and March 7, 2008. The MST raided two of their plantations (October 16) and occupied a factory run by Stora Enso because the two companies are seen as
harming land reform and family farming. As well, Syngenta is one of MST’s primary targets facing direct action. One of its fields was occupied on October 21 and two were invaded on December 10, 2007; a letter campaign was started on January 16, directed at the U.S. National Headquarters of Syngenta; and numerous demonstrations targeting the company took place in various cities across the country on March 7, 2008. Monsanto, a multinational agricultural corporation specialized in biotechnology, herbicides, genetically engineered seeds, and “efficient animal breeding”, was targeted directly as well when one of its research sites was occupied on March 7, 2008.

**Conclusion from case.**

Reasons of success; namely, the movement’s reliance on alliances, political opportunities (partly created through the movement’s alliances), and its tactics. Building alliances leads to a higher number of protestors involved, which, in turn, can lead to other organizations joining in.

Also, getting 4,000,000 people to cast their vote in a plebiscite is a considerable success and could only be accomplished with the help of other organizations. The MST worked with the Unique Worker’s Centre (CUT) and 200 smaller social movements. This alliance managed to recruit 100,000 volunteers who traveled through the country in order to mobilize people (Reardon, 2007; Vazquez, 2007). I highly doubt that the MST could have achieved the same result by itself.

Movement has better chances of being successful “when institutional access opens, when alignments shift, when conflicts emerge among elites and when allies become available” (1994:81). Political opportunities are both seized and created (Tarrow, 1994:81) and with the building of strong alliances a split among the elites can be created and a political opportunity opened up. The plebiscite, for example, can be seen as a political opportunity. The mobilization for the plebiscite as well as its result put considerable pressure on the government and, indeed, resulted in a split in the government structure. Furthermore, the movement already has access to the authorities.

**Strategies**

There was a 62-day march, a plebiscite, numerous occupations (of land and railways), raids and the destruction of seeds and saplings, email and letter campaigns, a collective day of action (national fast day), the publication of a manifesto, and ordinary street demonstrations. Although the wide range of tactics might already contribute to the movement’s success, we want to emphasize one tactic that stands out. That is, its mass-direct action approach (e.g. in the form of occupations and raids), which we believe contributes considerably to the movement’s success. The movement identifies unproductive land and simply takes it.

2. **Anti-World Cup movement**

Protests have taken place throughout Brazil today as embers of the violence which rocked the country during the Confederations Cup last summer reignite with less than a month to go until the opening of the FIFA World Cup.

Although the unrest has socio-economic overtones as well as a political dimension, with five months to go until the Presidential elections, the costs associated with hosting the World Cup appears the foremost cause for the unrest.
In business hub São Paulo, around 5,000 members of the Homeless Workers' Movement set fire to car tyres and marched towards the Corinthians Arena, due to host the opening match between Brazil and Croatia on June 12. In response riot police fired tear gas to disperse the protesters. More than 200 metalworkers also held a protest against unemployment outside a factory in the south of the city, while there were reports of several other demonstrations elsewhere, as well as roads being blocked and cars being set on fire.

Protests have also taken place in Rio de Janeiro, where the World Cup final is scheduled to be played, while there have been calls for protests via social media in at least 10 of the 12 cities hosting matches.

The most serious clashes have been in the northern city of Recife, where an undisclosed number of Federal troops have entered the city today after shops and supermarkets were ransacked overnight.

This comes after state police went on strike on demanding higher salaries, with schools and universities closed due to concerns for student safety.

Although this is seemingly less connected to the World Cup than eruptions elsewhere, Recife is set to host five matches during the tournament.

Although at this stage there were a far smaller number of protesters involved than during the Confederations Cup last summer, when there were several deaths after days of disruption throughout the country, the increasingly radical and organized nature must be a concern. An anonymous group also hacked the official website of Sao Paulo's World Cup Organizing Committee yesterday and put up the slogan: "Without rights there will be no World Cup".

Events particularly blewed after the Brazilian Government optimistically forecast that World Cup tourist spending in Brazil in June and July that exceed $3 billion (£1.8 billion/€2.2 billion). Brazil has spent more than $11 billion (£7 billion/€8 billion) to organize the month-long event, money protesters say could have been better spent on pressing needs in areas such as transport, education and health care.

But the Government has played down the significance of the unrest, with Sports Minister Aldo Rebelo insisting, from his perspective, "these are specific claims by workers".